Despite the diversity of perspectives in this volume, many of the contributors seem to agree on one thing: the existing state-based judgment-recognition system needs replacing. Of course, opinions here and elsewhere differ on what precisely should replace it; most favor either a treaty binding American courts through self-execution or congressional implementation, or a self-standing federal statute. Regardless (and except for a few dissenters still defending the state-based status quo), the bulk of scholars and policy-makers appears to favor "federalization,"2 that is, the adoption of a nationwide judgment recognition standard.
Proponents of federalization list several problems with the current statebased approach. They argue that it frustrates U.S. foreign policy by allowing foreign creditors to take advantage of state-based policies that lack reciprocity requirements. They also cite its general failure to adequately protect debtors. But perhaps the most often-cited bases for federalization are achieving predictability for litigants, and discouraging state-by-state forum shopping. For the purpose of this chapter, I place both of these justifications under the umbrella of achieving uniformity.
Not everyone agrees, however, on whether uniformity is normatively desirable, and surprisingly, there is just slightly more consensus on how uniform the current system actually is. While acknowledging minor statutory variation, some observers insist there are "surprisingly few fundamental differences in the approaches" among the states,3 and that courts have interpreted those approaches relatively uniformly.4 One commentator notes that the 2005 Uniform Recognition Act, which has been adopted in large part by a plurality of states, states that its purpose is "not to depart from the basic rules or approach of the 1962 Act."5 In contrast, the majority calls the system a "dizzying patchwork," noting the several different substantive models (the 1962 and 2005 Uniform Recognition Acts, and approaches based on Hilton v. Guyot 6 and the Restatement) from which the state systems derive.7 In essence, then, much of the debate revolves around the concept and status of uniformity.
The purpose of this chapter is not to take a side in the normative policy dispute over a federalized versus state-based system.8 Instead, my goal is a narrow conceptual and methodological comment on that debate. First, I show how the debaters have largely misconceptualized uniformity, and I invite a reconsideration of how we view this component of the discourse. In that vein, I argue that "outcome" uniformity, i.e., past litigant and court behavior, can be observed empirically, and that that approach presents the most promising method to inform the policy debate. I note that because much of the recognition outcome is the product of judicial interpretation, there is a dearth of evidence showing that the federalized alternative would produce significantly more outcome uniformity than the current state-by-state approach. I finish by concluding that, while there may be good reasons for federalization, the uniformity justification currently lacks adequate theoretical and empirical support. That finding suggests that the practical consequences of choosing one approach over the other may not be all that meaningful. 
